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U.S. BORDER ENFORCEMENT: DRUGS, MIGRANTS, AND THE
RULE OF LAW
KEVIN R. JOHNSON*

O

VER the last few decades, law enforcement efforts to control the U.S.

borders have focused on drugs and illegal immigrants.1 While the
North American Free Trade Agreement encouraged the free flow of capital and goods across American borders, the United States almost simultaneously with the trade pact's approval took aggressive steps in the name of
reducing the flow of undocumented labor and drugs from its southern
neighbor, Mexico. 2 These measures, however, have proven to be more
symbolic than real in accomplishing their stated goals. 3 Undocumented
* Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, University of California at Davis,
Professor of Law and Chicana/o Studies; Director, Chicana/o Studies Program
(2000-01); A.B., University of California, Berkeley; J.D., Harvard University.
Thanks to Frank Rudy Cooper and the Villanova Law Review for inviting me to
participate in this Symposium. Comments from Diane Marie Amann and Nora
Demleitner greatly improved my thinking on this Article. Dean Rex Perschbacher
provided intellectual and other support necessary for the Article's completion.
1. See generally PETER ANDREAS, BORDER GAMES: POLICING THE U.S.-MExIco DIVIDE (2000) (analyzing such law enforcement efforts).
2. For a description of the potential impact of the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) on drug trafficking and undocumented migration, see
Laurie L. Levenson, NAFTA: A CriminalJustice Impact, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 843,
852-60 (1994). In analyzing the U.S. government's response to undocumented
immigrants and drugs, this Article does not mean to suggest that the two are equal
social problems. Some commentators and the public consider "the problem of
illegals (to be] almost synonymous with drug trafficking." SARA S. CHAPMAN & URSULA S. COLBY, ONE NATION... INDIVISIBLE? 185-86 (2001); see also United States v.
Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 899 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (stating that United
States government "is powerless to stop the tide of illegal aliens-and dangerous
drugs-that daily and freely cross[ ] our 2,000-mile southern boundary"). Criminal elements have engaged in organized efforts to smuggle drugs and humans
across international boundaries. See MANUEL CASTELLS, THE END OF THE MILLENNIUM 168-211 (2d ed. 2000). See generally Diane Marie Amann, Harmonic Convergence? Constitutional CriminalProcedure in an International Context, 75 IND. L.J. 809
(2000) (analyzing how globalization of crime has affected international criminal
law enforcement); Edgardo Rotman, The Globalization of Criminal Violence, 10 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1 (2000) (scrutinizing impact of globalization of crime).
The benefits of undocumented immigrants (although subject to debate, see STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 953-59 (2d ed.
1997) (summarizing debate over costs and benefits of undocumented immigration
to United States)) to the U.S. economy are, however, in no way comparable to the
scourge of drugs on this society. In that important way, the issues associated with
undocumented immigrants and drugs are not equivalent.
3. See generally ANDREAS, supra note 1 (analyzing political and symbolic impacts
of border enforcement, along with its lack of overall effectiveness); John A. Scan-

lan, Immigration Law and the Illusion of Numerical Contro4 36 U. MIAMI L. REv. 819
(1982) (analyzing "illusory" nature of U.S. government's efforts to control levels of
migration).

(897)
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immigrants and drugs regularly flow across the border, in no small part in
response to market forces. 4 Nonetheless, border enforcement has had
perhaps unintended consequences, including the loss of lives (almost exclusively of Mexican citizens) in the southern border region 5 and the stopping and questioning of large numbers of innocent persons, many of
6
Mexican ancestry, throughout the United States.
Both at U.S. borders and in our cities, drug and immigration enforcement are inextricably linked. On one hand, domestic efforts to remove
undocumented immigrants are designed to enforce the immigration laws
regulating entry into the country. On the other hand, law enforcement
efforts to interdict illegal drugs at the border seek to reduce the supply of
drugs in the United States.
Importantly, in both drug and immigration enforcement, law enforcement authorities frequently resort to race as a tool for uncovering violations of the law. The racial impacts of the war on drugs are welldocumented, 7 as are those resulting from U.S. immigration enforcement.8
Specifically, police allegedly employ racial profiles in traffic stops as a pretext to search for drugs, just as U.S. Border Patrol officers employ "illegal
4. See U.S. Bureau of the Census, Report Supporting the Recommendation
for ESCAP II (Final Report) (Oct. 2001), at http://www.census.gov/dmd/www/
ReportRec2.htm (estimating that between 7.6 and 8.8 million undocumented immigrants lived in United States in 2000); Eric Blumenson & Eva Nilsen, Policingfor
Profit: The Drug War's Hidden Economic Agenda, 65 U. CHI. L. REv. 35, 36 (1998)
(outlining evidence supporting "a general consensus that the Drug War has been a
failure") (footnote omitted). Even after the massive efforts to increase border security immediately after September 11, 2001, see infra notes 64, 79-85 and accompanying text, undocumented migration from Mexico increased by early 2002. See
Daniel B. Wood, At Border, Uptick in Illegal Crossings, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan.
24, 2002, at 1.
5. See Bill Ong Hing, The Dark Side of Operation Gatekeeper, 7 U.C. DAVS J. INT'L
L. & POL'Y 121 (2001);Jorge A. Vargas, U.S. BorderPatrolAbuses, Undocumented Mexican Workers, and InternationalHuman Rights, 2 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 1, 64 (2001); see
also Timothy J. Dunn, Border Militarization Via Drug and Immigration Enforcement:
Human Rights Implications, 28 Soc. JUST. 7 (2001) (analyzing human rights implications of border immigration and drug enforcement); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFIcE, INS' SOUTHwEST BORDER STRATEGY: RESOURCE AND IMPACT ISSUES REMAIN
AFrER SEVEN YEARS 2-3 (Aug. 2001) (summarizing study of increased Immigration
and Naturalization Service (INS) enforcement efforts along southern border with
Mexico and shifting of migrant traffic to more dangerous routes).
6. See infra notes 52-64 and accompanying text.
7. See Ira Glasser, American Drug Laws: The New Jim Crow, 63 ALB. L. REV. 703,
710 (2000); Kenneth B. Nunn, The "DardenDilemma": Should African Americans Prosecute Crimes?, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1473, 1479 (2000); David Rudovsky, The Impact of
the War on Drugs on ProceduralFairnessand Racial Equality, 1994 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
237, 237; Michael Tonry, Race and the War on Drugs, 1994 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 25, 25;
Note, Winning the War on Drugs: A "Second Chance"for Nonviolent Drug Offenders, 113
HARV.L. REV. 1485, 1493 (2000). But see RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME AND THE
LAw 351-86 (1997) (questioning whether U.S. drug laws discriminate on basis of
race).

8. See infta notes 52-64 and accompanying text.
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alien" and drug courier profiles with race as their touchstone. 9 Moreover,
after the horrible destruction of September 11, 2001, federal law enforcement authorities have focused on Arabs and Muslims in the ongoing criminal investigation. 10 With border security tightened, drug seizures have
risen dramatically.1 1
Part I of this Article summarizes the law concerning race-based law
enforcement in the United States. Part II considers the use of race at the
U.S. borders in the massive effort to stem the flow of drugs and migrants
into the country and analyzes U.S. Customs Service reforms that have reduced reliance on race by limiting line officer discretion while improving
the effectiveness of border searches and seizures. Part III considers the
disparate racial impacts resulting from the placement of undue discretion
in the hands of law enforcement officers, which invites excessive reliance
on race. It suggests the need for increased limits on law enforcement discretion, perhaps through the promulgation of internal rules and regulations, to reduce the centrality of race to domestic and international law
enforcement. Somewhat counter-intuitively, such limits hold the potential
of improving law enforcement, as well as reducing invidious
discrimination.
I.

RACE

AND LAw ENFORCEMENT

Over the last few years, Americans have increasingly recognized the
racial skew to criminal law enforcement in the United States. A prominent example is the public furor over racial profiling of African Americans. 12 Reliance on racial stereotypes in U.S. immigration enforcement
also has long plagued Latina/os, Asian Americans, and other groups, including persons of Arab ancestry. 13 Unfortunately, stereotypes may result
in law enforcement's excessive and misplaced reliance on physical appearance as an indicator of legal wrongdoing.

9. See Tovah Rennee Calder6n, Race-Based Policingfrom Terry to Wardlow: Steps

Down the TotalitarianPath,44 How. L.J. 73, 91-93 (2000);Jack B. Weinstein & Mae

C. Quinn, Terry, Race, andJudicialIntegrity: The Court and Suppression Duringthe War
on Drugs, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 1323, 1332 (1998).

10. See infra notes 64, 79-85 and accompanying text.
11. See Fox Butterfield, Drug Seizures Have Surged at the Borders, Officials Say,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2001, at A32. The U.S. government has pressed the Mexican
government to assist in ensuring border security in the "war on terrorism." See US.
Frets Over Lax Mexican Security, VENTURA COUNTY STAR, Dec. 29, 2001, at A18.

12. See infra text accompanying notes 14-43.
13. See generally ALFREDO

MIRANDt, GRINGOJUSTICE

(1987) (documenting his-

tory of discriminatory border enforcement).
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CriminalLaw Enforcement

Many commentators claim that police routinely stop African Ameri15
14
cans for "driving while Black" and Latina/os for "driving while brown.
This practice represents the proverbial tip of the iceberg of the racial disparities in the nation's criminal justice system. 16 Studies show that police
are stopping "blacks, Latinos and Asians approximately eight to ten times
7
as often as they are stopping whites."'
To comply with the U.S. Constitution, police officers ordinarily must
have individualized reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct before conducting an investigatory stop.18 Racial profiles based on alleged group
propensities rather than individualized suspicion, generally violate the
law. 19 The Supreme Court, however, has done little to enforce the legal
prohibition or, more generally, to remove the taint of race and racism
from criminal law enforcement. 20 Indeed, one commentator has gone so
14. See AngelaJ. Davis, Race, Cops, and Traffic Stops, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 425,
431-32 (1997); David A. Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law: Why "Driving
While Black" Matters, 84 MINN. L. REV. 265, 265, 275 (1999); Katheryn K. Russell,
'Driving While Black" CorollaryPhenomena and CollateralConsequences, 40 B.C. L. REv.
717, 721 (1999); Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and the
Fourth Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 956, 957 (1999); see, e.g., Price v. Kramer, 200
F.3d 1237, 1249-51 (9th Cir. 2000).
15. See, e.g., Chavez v. Ill. State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 620 (7th Cir. 2001); Martinez v. Mount Prospect, 92 F. Supp. 2d 780, 781 (N.D. Ill. 2000); Rodriguez v. Cal.
Highway Patrol, 89 F. Supp. 2d 1131, 1134, 113941 (N.D. Cal. 2000); Nat'l Cong.
for Puerto Rican Rights v. New York, 191 F.R.D. 52, 53 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
16. See, e.g., DAVID COLE, No EQUALJUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN
JUSTICE SYSTEM

17 (1999);

KENNEDY,

and the CriminalJustice System, in
THE TWENTY-FIRsT CENTURY

supra note 7, at 29; Cruz Reynoso, Hispanics

HISPANICS IN THE UNITED STATES: AN AGENDA FOR

277 (Pastora San Juan Cafferty & David W. Engstrom

eds., 2000). The prevalence of racism in the criminal justice system led to a controversial proposal for jury nullification. See Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the CriminalJustice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 715 (1995).
17. PromotingRacialEquality, 9J.L. & POL'Y 347, 365 (2001) (noting comments
of Professor Deborah A. Ramirez) (footnote omitted).
18. See, e.g., United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989); Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 27 (1968). For a criticism of the racial impacts of Terry, the famous decision
allowing police officers the legal authority to conduct an investigatory stop with
less than probable cause, see Tracey Maclin, Terry v. Ohio's Fourth Amendment Legacy: Black Men and Police Discretion, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1271, 1279 (1998).
19. See, e.g., United States v. Sigmond-Ballesteros, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS
6778, at *6, (9th Cir. Apr. 12, 2002) (stating that reasonable suspicion necessary
for traffic stop cannot be "'based on broad profiles which cast suspicion on entire
categories of people without any individualized suspicion of the particular person
to be stopped'") (citation omitted); United States v. Laymon, 730 F. Supp. 332,
342 (D. Colo. 1990) (granting motion to suppress evidence in case in which evidence showed that drug task force focused enforcement efforts on African Americans and Latina/os).
20. See, e.g., Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 121-25 (2000) (refusing to disturb conviction in which police stopped defendant because individual fled upon
seeing police patrol area known for heavy narcotics trafficking, despite fact that
innocent minorities might flee police out of fear for personal safety); McCleskey v.
Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 282, 317 (1987) (upholding imposition of death penalty on
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far as to contend that the discretion afforded police in investigatory stops
by the Court has contributed to the prevalence of racial profiling in law
21
enforcement.
In Whren v. United States,22 for example, the Court held that, even if
police offered pretextual reasons for a traffic stop and the stop in fact was
based on the race of the driver, the Fourth Amendment was satisfied so
long as the officers had probable cause to conclude that the driver had
committed a traffic infraction. According to the Court, the pretextual basis for the stop did not invalidate the stop under the Fourth Amendment,
although it might serve as a basis for an Equal Protection claim. 23 Equal
Protection violations, however, are notoriously difficult to prove because
of the need to establish that the police possessed a "discriminatory intent."2 4 Police rarely admit such an intent and statistical data alone has
25
been found to be insufficient to prove an invidious motive.
Because no ready and reliable legal remedy exists,

26

state legislatures

27

have considered the problem of racial profiling, with some requiring the
collection of data on traffic stops and the adoption of policies prohibiting
racial profiling. 28 The jury is out on whether such reforms will remedy, or
ameliorate in any way, the problem. However, at this time, state and local
policy initiatives appear to hold promise for addressing racial profiling. 29
African American man in face of statistical evidence that State of Georgia administered death penalty in racially discriminatory manner).
21. See Harris, supra note 14, at 310-19. For an argument that the Supreme
Court's reasoning in decisions finding that criminal laws bestowing undue discretion are unconstitutionally vague applies equally to Fourth Amendment doctrine,
see Tracey Maclin, What Can Fourth Amendment Doctrine Learn from Vagueness Doctrine?, 3 U. PA.J. CONST'L L. 398 (2001).

22. 517 U.S. 806 (1996). For a sampling of criticism of Whren, see Davis, supra
note 14, at 432-42, Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 VAND. L. REv.
333, 375 (1998), and Thompson, supra note 14, at 978.
23. See Whren, 517 U.S. at 813.
24. See Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri L. Johnson, The Effects of Intent: Do We
Know How Legal Standards Work?, 76 CORNELL L. REv. 1151, 1160 (1991) (studying
negative impacts of discriminatory intent requirement of Washington v. Davis, 426
U.S. 229, 238-39 (1976), on plaintiffs in Equal Protection cases); see also Ian F.
Haney Lopez, InstitutionalRacism:JudicialConduct and a New Theory of RacialDiscrimination, 109 YALE L.J. 1717, 1769 (2000) (offering theory of institutional racism not
necessarily tied to discriminatory intent). For criticisms of the discriminatory intent requirement, see generally BarbaraJ. Flagg, "Was Blind, But Now I See". White
Race Consciousness and the Requirement of Discriminatoy Intent, 91 MICH. L. REv. 953
(1993) and Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning
with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987).

25. See, e.g., McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 319.
26. See David Rudovsky, Law Enforcement by Stereotypes and Serendipity: RacialProfiling and Stops and Searches Without Cause, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 296, 349 (2001)
(summarizing deficiencies with various available legal remedies for racial
profiling).
27. See Gregory M. Lipper, Recent Development: Racial Profiling, 38 HARV. J. ON
LEGIs. 551, 551 (2001) (summarizing legislative developments).
28. See infra note 138 and accompanying text.

29. See infra notes 114-41 and accompanying text.
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Traffic Stops, DrugProfiles, and the War on Drugs

Traffic stops are central to the war on drugs. 30 Currently, "drug
crimes ... are what the great majority of pretext traffic stops are about." 3 1
Not coincidentally, racial profiling as a formal law enforcement technique
arose in efforts to combat drug trafficking.
Despite sustained scholarly criticism, 32 courts have tolerated drug
profiles. For example, the Supreme Court has held that, although the
Fourth Amendment requires individualized suspicion, an investigatory
stop was valid if law enforcement considered the person's behavior to be
consistent with a drug profile; rather, "the agent [must] articulate the factors leading to [the existence of reasonable suspicion], but the fact that

these factors may be set forth in a 'profile' does not somehow detract from
their evidentiary significance . .

.33

While the Supreme Court has neither condemned nor endorsed the
use of drug courier profiles, the lower federal courts have effectively sanctioned their use, even if race was a component of the profile in question.
In United States v. Weaver,34 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit allowed law enforcement to rely on a drug courier profile that included race in deciding to stop and question an African American man at
an airport. Similarly, in United States v. Malone,35 the Eighth Circuit affirmed a conviction in a case in which Drug Enforcement Administration
agents stopped a person because he fit the "L.A. gang member" profile,
which included the fact that he was African American.
The use of race in drug profiles by its nature disparately impacts minority communities. More generally, commentators have roundly criticized the disparate impact of the entire war on drugs on the African
American and Latina/o communities. 36 In Professor Dorothy Roberts'
words, the drug war "facilitates the incarceration of large numbers of in37
ner-city blacks" well out of proportion to their drug use.
30. See Lisa Walter, Comment, EradicatingRacial Stereotyping from Terry Stops:
The Casefor an Equal Protection Exclusionary Rule, 71 U. CoLo. L. REv. 255, 258-66
(2000).
31. David Harris, Law Enforcement's Stake in Coming to Grips With RacialProfiling,
3 RUTGERS RACE & L. REv. 9, 13 (2001).
32. See, e.g., Charles L. Becton, The Drug Courier Profile: "All Seems Infected that
th' Infected Spy, As All Looks Yellow to the Jaundic'dEye", 65 N.C. L. REv. 417, 423
(1987); Morgan Cloud, Search and Seizure by the Numbers: The Drug CourierProfile and
JudicialReview of InvestigativeFormulas,65 B.U. L. REv. 843, 847 (1985); see also Sheri
Lynn Johnson, Race and the Decision to Detain a Suspect, 93 YALE L.J. 214, 230 (1983)
(discussing use of race in immigration enforcement and drug profiles).
33. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 10 (1989).
34. 966 F.2d 391 (8th Cir. 1992).
35. 886 F.2d 1162 (8th Cir. 1989).
36. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (citing authorities).
37. Dorothy E. Roberts, Crime, Race, and Reproduction, 67 TUL. L. REv. 1945,
1956 (1993) (footnote omitted).
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Efforts to challenge a pattern and practice of race-based traffic stops
in drug enforcement efforts prove inherently difficult. In Chavez v. Illinois
State Police,3 8 for example, the court affirmed summary judgment for the
Illinois State Police in a case alleging racial profiling in a drug interdiction
operation. In Chavez, experts reviewing the available statistical data found
that African Americans and Hispanics were greatly over-represented in police stops. 39 Strong individual evidence was presented as well. Specifically, in Chavez, the police stopped a Latino, Peso Chavez (the named
plaintiff), for an illegal lane change, subjected him to an unsuccessful
drug search, and ticketed him for a traffic infraction. 40 In contrast to Chavez's treatment by police, a white woman following Chavez's automobile,
41
who was driving a similar vehicle in a similar manner, was not stopped.
State police also stopped an innocent African American plaintiff on not
one, but three, separate occasions. 4 2 Nevertheless, such evidence was insufficient to convince the court that an Equal Protection violation had
43
been established.
2.

Race and CriminalInvestigation

Race also comes into play in law enforcement in a more routine,
seemingly innocent, way. If the perpetrator of a crime has been identified
as being of a particular racial group, police can lawfully rely on race in
stopping a person. 44 Unlike racial profiling, this use of race does not focus exclusively on statistical probabilities based on group membership.
Nonetheless, even though race may be a logical factor to consider under
these circumstances, police may rely excessively on race in criminal investi45
gation and emphasize it over all else.
Consider Brown v. City of Oneonta.46 In this case, the victim identified
a young African American man as the perpetrator of a burglary and assault
38. 251 F.3d 612 (7th Cir. 2001).
39. See Chavez, 251 F.3d at 625-26.

40. See id. at 623-24.
41. See id. Similar modes of proof have been employed successfully in housing discrimination lawsuits. SeeJOHN YINGER, CLOSED DOORS, OPPORTUNITIES LOST:
THE CONTINUING COSTS OF HOUSING DISCRIMINATION 19 (1995) (discussing "testing" in housing discrimination litigation); Alex S. Navarro, Note, Bona Fide Damages
for Tester Plaintiffs: An Economic Approach to Private Enforcement of the Antidiscrimination Statutes, 81 GEO. L.J. 2727, 2734 (1993) (same).
42. See Chavez, 251 F.3d at 624-25.
43. See id. at 645-48; see also supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text (men-

tioning difficulties in establishing Equal Protection violation).
44. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 254 F.3d 679, 682 (7th Cir. 2001)
(holding that officers could consider race in stop when "a bank robber [was] de-

scribed as a black male").
45. See generally R. Richard Banks, Race-Based Suspect Selection and Colorblind

Equal Protection Doctrine,48 UCLA L. REv. 1075 (2001) (analyzing need for meaningful Equal Protection scrutiny of police tactics focused on members of minority
groups in these circumstances).
46. 221 F.3d 329 (2d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 44 (2001).
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who, while committing the crime, cut himself with a knife. 47 As a result of
this identification:
The police immediately contacted [the university in Oneonta, a
small, predominantly white town in upstate New York] and requested a list of its black male students. An official.. . supplied the
list, and the police attempted to locate and question every black male student .... This endeavor produced no suspects. Then, over the next
several days, the police conducted a "sweep" of Oneonta, stopping and
questioning non-white persons on the streets and inspecting their hands
for cuts. More than two hundred persons were questioned during that
48
period, but no suspect was apprehended.
Emphasizing that police did not rely on statistical probabilities based on
race in making the stops, but on the victim's identification of the perpetrator, the Second Circuit held that the police sweep of hundreds of African
American males in a town did not violate the Equal Protection
49
guarantee.
The result in Brown is troubling. The police employed an old-fashioned dragnet focused on all African American men, not unlike police
techniques long condemned as overbroad and over-inclusive.5 0 Although
one might allow race to be a factor in a decision to stop a suspected perpetrator, among others such as height, weight, clothing, and other characteristics, that cannotjustify the questioning of every African American man in
town. The police conduct in Brown therefore suggests that police over51
relied on race in the investigation of a crime.
B.

Immigration Enforcement

As we have seen, race often influences criminal law enforcement.
Even though this influence violates the law in certain circumstances, enforcement has proven difficult. 52 In contrast, judicially sanctioned racial
profiling is central to the U.S. government's enforcement of the immigra47. See Brown, 221 F.3d at 335.
48. Id. at 334.
49. See id. at 337 ("Plaintiffs do not allege that upon hearing that a violent
crime had been committed, the police used an established profile of violent
criminals to determine that the suspect must have been black. Nor do they allege
that the defendant law enforcement agencies have a regular policy based upon
racial stereotypes that all black . . . residents be questioned whenever a violent
crime is reported.").
50. See Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws,
37 CAL. L. REv. 341, 351 (1949).
51. See, e.g., Banks, supra note 45, at 1090-92; Roberts, supra note 37, at 194748 & n.8. The effort by the U.S. government to question large numbers of Muslim
immigrants in the United States in the investigation of the devastation of September 11, 2001 shares similar characteristics with the dragnet in Brown. See infra notes
64, 79-85 and accompanying text.
52. See supra notes 14-51 and accompanying text.
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tion laws. 53 In United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,54 the Supreme Court invalidated a Border Patrol stop made exclusively on Mexican appearance.
However, in doing so the Court stated that "[t] he likelihood that any given
person of Mexican ancestry is an alien is high enough to make Mexican
appearancea relevant factor" in making an immigration stop.5 5 Unlike in
the criminal context, 56 this rule applies whether or not a person of "Mexican appearance" has been identified as entering the country unlawfully or
violating the law in any way.
A striking anomaly from the color-blindness generally required by the
Supreme Court,57 this explicit consideration of race has dramatically influenced immigration enforcement. For example, Border Patrol officers routinely rely on one's "Hispanic appearance" 58 in deciding to question a
person. Evidence supports the claim that the Border Patrol over-relies on
physical appearance, as has arguably been the case in criminal law enforcement in those cases where race is lawfully considered in an investigatory stop. 59 Plaintiffs regularly bring actions claiming that the Border
Patrol focuses almost exclusively on race in immigration stops. 60 One case
revealed that the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) employs
an "illegal alien" profile; INS officials testified that an officer might properly rely, along with Hispanic appearance, on a "hungry look" and the fact
61
that a person was "dirty, unkempt," or "wears work clothing."
53. For arguments for ending the practice, see Kevin R. Johnson, The Case
Against Race Profiling in ImmigrationEnforcement, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 675, 707 (2000).
See also Victor C. Romero, Racial Profiling: "DrivingWhile Mexican" and Affirmative
Action, 6 MicHi. J. RACE & L. 195, 195 (2000) (analyzing arguments against racial
profiling and contrasting them with those in favor of affirmative action).
54. 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
55. Brignoni-Ponce,422 U.S. at 886-87 (emphasis added). But see United States
v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1130-35 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (disregarding language in Brignoni-Ponceand holding that Border Patrol cannot lawfully consider "Hispanic appearance" in deciding to make immigration stop).
56. See supra notes 14-51 and accompanying text (analyzing use of race in
criminal law enforcement).
57. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995)
(holding that all racial classifications, including those in federal program to increase government contracting with minority businesses, are subject to strict scrutiny); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 505 (1989) (same).
58. "Hispanic appearance" is an overbroad and ambiguous classification for
gauging a person's immigration status. SeeJohnson, supra note 53, at 707-11. Importantly, Latina/os are of many different physical appearances. See Kevin R. Johnson, "MeltingPot" or "Ring of Fire?" Assimilation and the Mexican-American Experience,
85 CAL. L. REv. 1261, 1291-93 (1997).
59. See supra notes 34-35, 44-51 and accompanying text.
60. See, e.g., Hodgers-Durgin v. de la Vina, 199 F.3d 1037, 1038 (9th Cir. 1999)
(en banc); Nicacio v. INS, 797 F.2d 700, 701 (9th Cir. 1985); LaDuke v. Nelson,
762 F.2d 1318, 1321 (9th Cir. 1985), modified, 796 F.2d 309 (9th Cir. 1986); I11.
Migrant Council v. Pilliod, 540 F.2d 1062, 1065 (7th Cir. 1976), modified, 548 F.2d
715 (7th Cir. 1977) (en banc); Murillo v. Musegades, 809 F. Supp. 487, 497 (W.D.
Tex. 1992).
61. Nicacio, 797 F.2d at 704.
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Other racial groups suffer similar profiling in the enforcement of immigration laws. INS questioning of Asian Americans about their immigra62
tion status often is based on the presumption that they are foreigners.
Along similar lines, persons of African ancestry who arrive at airports have
63
found themselves presumed to be entering the country unlawfully.
Moreover, after the horrible loss of life on September 11, 2001, many
"Arab" or "Muslim" appearing people have been subject to special scrutiny
by immigration and other law enforcement officers; the U.S. government,
for example, endeavored to question five thousand Arabs and Muslims in
the country-none suspected of a crime-for leads about terrorist
64
networks.
In sum, the law permits race to be considered in border stops. However, it appears that, once that concession is made, race dominates the
enforcement process. The delegation of discretion to the lowest levels of
law enforcement makes this possible. As we shall see, such discretion has
reached its zenith at the U.S./Mexican border.
II.

THE WAR ON DRUGS AND "LAw" AT THE BORDER

As discussed in Part I, race often influences criminal and immigration
law enforcement. At the border, the law permits race-based searches of a
type that go well beyond those permitted elsewhere. As then-Justice Rehnquist explained:
62. See, e.g., Chueng Tin Wong v. INS, 468 F.2d 1123, 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
(holding that appearance of Asian ancestry combined with other factors justified
INS stop); see also Neil Gotanda, Comparative Racialization: Racial Profiling and the
Case of Wen Ho Lee, 47 UCLA L. REv. 1689, 1689 (2000) (contending that stereotypes about Asians contributed to federal government's trumped up espionage
charges against Wen Ho Lee).
63. See, e.g., Orhorhaghe v. INS, 38 F.3d 488, 497-98 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding
that INS improperly investigated person's immigration status based on his "Nigerian-sounding name," which court reasoned might serve as proxy for race); Toni
Locy, Lawsuit Spotlights Alleged INS Abuses at Airports, USA TODAY, Oct. 18, 2000, at
l A (reporting that INS accused Black college student, with lawful immigration
status, returning from visit to Jamaica, of being in United States on false documents, and strip searched, shackled, and detained him).
64. See Elizabeth Bumiller & David Johnston, Bush Sets Military Trials in Terrorism Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2001, at Al; Ken Ellingwood & Nicholas Riccardi,
Arab Americans EnduringHardStares of Other Fliers,L.A. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2001, at Al;
see also Laurie Goodstein & Tamar Lewin, Victims of Mistaken Identity, Sikhs Pay a
Pricefor Turbans, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2001, at Al (recounting violence against Sikh
community after events of September 11, including killing of Sikh gas station
owner in Arizona). Even before that date, Arabs and Muslims were subject to special treatment tinder the law, including procedures allowing deportation based on
secret evidence not disclosed to them, in the name of fighting terrorism. See, e.g.,
Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 492 (1999) (refusing to intervene in action in which Muslim noncitizens claimed that efforts to
deport them from country were based on impermissible ideological grounds);
Kiareldeen v. Reno, 71 F. Supp. 2d 402, 404 (D.N.J. 1999) (granting writ of habeas
corpus in case of Palestinian man detained for over one year based on secret evidence of alleged terrorist activity).
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907

[S]earches made at the border, pursuant to the long-standing
right of the sovereign to protect itself by stopping and examining
persons and property crossing into this country, are reasonable .... Border searches
from before the adoption of the Fourth
Amendment, have been considered to be "reasonable" by the single fact
that the person or item in question has entered into our country from

outside. There has never been any additional requirement that
the reasonableness of a border search depended on the existence of probable cause. This longstandingrecognition that searches
at our borders without probable cause and without a warrantare nonethe65
less "reasonable"has a history as old as the Fourth Amendment.
In United States v. Montoya de Hernandez,66 the Supreme Court upheld
a detention at the border and emphasized that "[s] ince the founding of our

Republic, Congress has granted the Executive plenary authority to conduct
routine searches and seizures at the border, without probable cause or a
warrant, in order to regulate the collection of duties and to prevent the
introduction of contraband into this country."6 7 In re-affirming the "border exception" to the Fourth Amendment, the Court in Montoya de Hernandez upheld the search of a suspect who, upon arrival on a flight from
Bogota, Colombia, was stopped by U.S. Customs Service officers. The suspect was then "detained ... because she fit the profile of an 'alimentary

canal smuggler,"' was strip searched, and, when she refused an x-ray, was
held until she had a bowel movement, without being allowed to contact
her husband or an attorney. 68 After almost a full day had passed, the Customs Service contacted a magistrate to request a court-ordered x-ray and
body cavity search before a rectal examination produced contraband. 69
The fact that Montoya de Hernandez arrived in this country from Bogota, Colombia contributed to the decision to detain her. 70 The Court in
Montoya de Hernandez noted that race, which often coincides with national
origin, was a proper consideration in border enforcement: "[a] utomotive
travelers may be stopped at fixed checkpoints near the border without indi65. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616, 619 (1977) (footnote omitted)

(emphasis added); see Louis Fisher, Congress and the Fourth Amendment, 21 GA. L.
REv. 107, 112 (1986) ("Long before the Supreme Court discovered exceptions to

the warrant requirement [of the Fourth Amendment], Congress and the executive
branch decided that warrants were not necessary for border searches."); cf David
A. Sklansky, The FourthAmendment and Common Law, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 1739, 1744
(2000) (contending that current Supreme Court has turned to reliance on common law and tradition in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence).
66. 473 U.S. 531 (1985).
67. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 537 (citations omitted) (emphasis added); see also Thirtieth Annual Review of CriminalProcedure, 89 GEO. L.J. 1045, 1141
(2001) (analyzing case law of border searches).
68. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 545-46 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see
supra text accompanying notes 31-43 (discussing use of drug courier profiles).
69. See Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 547-48.
70. See id. at 533.
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vidualized suspicion even if the stop is based largely on ethnicity."7 1 As one court
of appeals later understood the "border exception" cases, the contention

that a border search is not routine, and thus subject to more rigorous legal
requirements, "if motivated by [the] ethnicity of a person searched," is
72
groundless.
The "border exception" to the Fourth Amendment, as it has come to
be known, is well-established. 73 As is so often the case with the exceptions,
this exception has proven difficult to cabin. In upholding a warrantless
search over twenty miles away from the Mexican border, the Supreme
Court expanded the exception to apply not just to the border, but to "its
74
functional equivalents."
One federal court of appeals judge contends that a further expansion
has silently occurred; he proclaims that the U.S. "government's so-called
War on Drugs and its efforts to interdict illegal immigration" 7 5 have eviscerated Fourth Amendment protections in the entire border region:
I find inescapable the conclusion that the [Border Patrol] agent
in this case was adjudged to have acted reasonably for Fourth
Amendment purposes only because we of the federal judiciary
have accepted the proposition that the mission of interdicting
illegal aliens (or drugs) in proximity to the Mexican borderjustifies riding roughshod over the Fourth Amendment's guarantees.
[This] encourag[es] agents on roving patrol to conduct warrantless
searches, devoid of reasonablesuspicion, much less probable cause. How
71. Id. at 538 (citing United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 562-63
(1976)) (emphasis added). In Martinez-Fuerte, the Court found that the Border
Patrol's consideration of "apparent Mexican ancestry" in deciding to direct automobiles to secondary inspection at fixed checkpoints miles from the border, did
not violate the Fourth Amendment. 428 U.S. at 563-64.
72. United States v. Ojebode, 957 F.2d 1218, 1223 (5th Cir. 1992).

73. See

WAYNE LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

236 (3d ed. 2000) (sum-

marizing border exception law for routine searches).
74. See Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272 (1973).

Court offered examples of a "functional equivalent" of border searches:

The

[SIearches at an established station near the border, at a point marking
the confluence of two or more roads that extend from the border, might
be functional equivalents of border searches. For another example, a
search of the passengers and cargo of an airplane arriving at a St. Louis
airport after a nonstop flight from Mexico City would clearly be the functional equivalent of a border search.
Id. at 273 (footnote omitted); see also United States v. Salgado, 917 F. Supp. 996,
1007 (W.D.N.Y. 1996) (stating that, for purposes of "border exception," "the term
'border area' has been given an elastic connotation") (citation omitted); Gregory
T. Arnold, Casebrief, Bordering on Unreasonableness?The Third CircuitAgain Expands
the Border Search Exception in United States v. Hyde, 40 VILL. L. REv. 835 (1995)
(analyzing case interpreting "functional equivalents" language); Paul S. Rosenzweig, Comment, Functional Equivalents of the Border, Sovereignty, and the Fourth
Amendment, 52 U. Cuu. L. Riv. 1119 (1985) (studying what constitutes "functional
equivalents of border").
75. United States v. Zapata-Ibarra, 223 F.3d 281, 281 (5th Cir. 2000) (Wiener,

J., dissenting).
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is this practice distinguishablefrom the former practice of Southern peace
officers who randomly stopped black pedestrians to inquire, "Hey, boy,
76
what are you doin' in this neighborhood.F'

Judge Wiener further commented that:
I sense that history is likely to judge thejudiciary's evisceration of
the Fourth Amendment in the vicinity of the Mexican border as
yet another jurisprudential nadir, joining Korematsu, Dred Scott,
and even Plessy on the list of our most shameful failures to discharge our duty of defending constitutional civil liberties against
77
the popular hue and cry that would have us abridge them.
Other federal judges have expressed agreement with the thrust of this
78
analysis.
After the tragic events of September 11, 2001, 79 it seems unlikely that
the courts, including the Supreme Court, will limit the Fourth Amendment's "border exception." Indeed, the indications are to the contrary.
Increased searches at airports and ports of entry and detention of noncitizens were part of the increased security measures.8 0 The U.S. government arrested over 1000 persons-almost all of them Arab or Muslim-as
81
either material witnesses or because of routine immigration violations.
The U.S. government also endeavored to interview thousands of Arab and
Muslim noncitizens in the country, although there was no evidence that
they had knowledge directly relevant to the crimes. 82 Within weeks of the
violence, Congress passed the USA PATRIOT Act, which allows the Attorney General to detain a suspected terrorist for seven days before being
required to institute removal proceedings or charge the noncitizen with a
76. Id. at 285 (emphasis added).
77. Id. at 282 (footnote citing, inter alia, Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.

214 (1944); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)).
78. See United States v. Jacquinot, 258 F.3d 423, 432 (5th Cir. 2001) (Parker,
J., specially concurring) (criticizing finding that Border Patrol had reasonable suspicion for stop and stating that "I remain hopeful that at some point in time, the
hysteria regarding the ill-fated war on drugs and its impact on the Fourth Amendment will subside and the rule of reason will again prevail"); United States v. Guerrero-Barajas, 240 F.3d 428, 436 (5th Cir. 2001) (Dennis, J., dissenting) (endorsing
view that "border exception" will be condemned in annals of history as constitutional anomaly).
79. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
80. See id.
81. See Lois Romano & David S. Fallis, Questions Swirl Around Men Held in
TerrorProbe, WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 2001, at Al; David E. Rovella, Clock Ticks on 9/11
Detentions, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 5, 2001, at Al; A DeliberateStrategy of Disruption; Massive,
Secretive Detention Effort Aimed Mainly at Preventing More Terror, WASH. POST, Nov. 4,
2001, at Al.
82. See Bumiller & Johnston, supra note 64.
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criminal offense. 83 Finally, President Bush issued a military order permitting noncitizens accused of terrorist attacks in the United States to be tried
in military courts. 84 Such drastic measures, with obvious civil rights implications, in the name of national security, suggest that courts85 are unlikely to
narrow the "border exception" in the foreseeable future.
Moreover, the "border exception" to the Fourth Amendment finds
support in the foundational principles of U.S. immigration law. The Supreme Court created the "plenary power" doctrine to immunize congressional immigration judgments from constitutional scrutiny, which at times
has shielded racial and national origin exclusions in the immigration laws,
and has allowed Congress free reign in determining which categories of
immigrants to admit into the country. 86 Although much-maligned, 87 the
doctrine remains the law of the land. 88 Both the "border exception" and
the plenary power doctrine show how courts have held that the Constitution simply does not apply to government conduct with respect to people
and things entering the country.
A.

Migrants, Drugs, and the Border Exception

The border exception to the Fourth Amendment has an impact well
beyond searches at the border.89 In the southern border region, many
Border Patrol stops involve suspected migrant or drug smugglers. At
times, a race-based stop designed to investigate citizenship, which may be
83. See Pub. L. No. 107-56 § 412, 115 Stat. 272, 351 (2001) (Uniting and
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001) (hereinafter USA PATRIOT Act) (adding
§ 236A(a) (5) to Immigration & Nationality Act).
84. See Military Order, 66 Fed. Reg. 57833, 57834 (Nov. 16, 2001).
85. For analysis of the civil rights implications of the federal government's
response to the terrorist acts of September 11, 2001, see Susan M. Akram & Kevin
R. Johnson, Race, Civil Rights, and Immigration Law After September 11, 2001: The
Targeting of Muslims and Arabs, 58 ANN. SURV. AM. L. (forthcoming 2002).
86. See, e.g.,
The Chinese Exclusion Case (Chae Chan Ping v. United States), 130
U.S. 581 (1889).
87. See, e.g., GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION 134 (1996);
Gabriel J.Chin, Segregation'sLast Stronghold: Race Discriminationand the Constitutional
Law of Immigration, 46 UCLA L. REv. 1, 12-16 (1998); Linda Kelly, Preserving the
FundamentalRight to Family Unity: ChampioningNotions of Social Contract and Community Ties in the Battle of Plenary Power Versus Aliens? Rights, 41 VILL. L. REv. 725, 733
(1996); Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional Power, 1984 Sup. CT. REv. 255, 258.
88. See, e.g., Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 305-06 (1993); Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S.
787, 792 (1977).
89. Cf Margaret H. Taylor, DetainedAliens ChallengingConditions of Confinement
and the Porous Borders of the Plenary Power Doctrine, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1087,
1133 (1995) (contending that immigration law's plenary power doctrine, which
technically only immunizes Congress' substantive judgments over which groups of
immigrants to admit into United States, also impacts the decisions about treatment
of noncitizens in United States).
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lawful, 90 results in the discovery of illicit drugs.9 1 Express reliance on race
thus may influence drug arrests and convictions in a way beyond that ordi92
narily permitted in criminal law enforcement.
A case recently decided by the Supreme Court illustrates how an im93
migration stop can result in a drug conviction. In United States v. Arvizu,
a Border Patrol officer stopped a minivan with two adults and three children in a national forest located near the border, inquired about their
citizenship, and uncovered drugs in a search of the vehicle. The Ninth
Circuit had held that certain factors relied on by the officers in making the
initial stop-such as that the minivan slowed as the Border Patrol approached, and that the adults failed to wave to, or otherwise acknowledge
the officer, but did not expressly include the race of the occupants in the
minivan-could not lawfully justify the stop. 94 The court reiterated its
previous holding that "'factors that have such a low probative value that
no reasonable officer would have relied on them to make an investigative
stop must be disregarded as a matter of law." 95 The court further concluded that the legitimate factors considered by the Border Patrol-such
as that the road was commonly used by smugglers-could not legally jus96
tify the stop.
90. See supra notes 52-64 and accompanying text.
91. See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 335 (2000) (discussing case
in which Border Patrol officer boarded bus near border to check immigration status of passengers and later engaged in unlawful search of luggage for drugs);
United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc)
(addressing criminal case in which Border Patrol stop was based on Hispanic appearance, which at the time was legally relevant to immigration stop, but search
produced drugs that resulted in criminal indictment and conviction); United
States v. Rodriguez-Sanchez, 23 F.3d 1488, 1490 (9th Cir. 1994) (same). One court
has questioned the Border Patrol's authority to search for drugs, rather than undocumented immigrants. See United States v. Perkins, 166 F. Supp. 1116, 1122
(W.D. Tex. 2001). Race also plays a role in conviction of criminal immigration
offenses, which often arise from arrests in the border region. A disproportionate
number of Latina/os, for example, have been prosecuted under a federal law
prohibiting illegal re-entry into the country after being deported. See Pamela A.
MacLean, Study Suggests Hispanic Men Face Excessive Prosecution, DAILY RECORDER
(Sacramento), Oct. 11, 2001, at 1; see, e.g., Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523
U.S. 224 (1998); United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828 (1987); see also 8
U.S.C. § 1326(a) (providing that illegal re-entry into country after deportation is
criminal offense).
92. See supra notes 14-51 and accompanying text.
93. 232 F.3d 1241 (9th Cir. 2000), rev'd, 122 S.Ct. 744 (2002).
94. See id. at 1248-49.
95. Id. at 1249 (quoting Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d at 1132 (citation
omitted)).
96. See id. at 1251. Concern with allowing Border Patrol officers the necessary
discretion to ensure proper security in the wake of the events of September 11,
2001 led Justice O'Connor to question the court of appeals' approach in Arvizu at
oral argument in the case. See Tony Mauro, Safety Trumps Justice, Says Justice, RECORDER, Nov. 28, 2001, at 1. Nevertheless, as discussed here, there is little evidence
that increased discretion of this nature improves law enforcement. See infra notes
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The Ninth Circuit in Arvizu attempted to limit the factors that the
Border Patrol may consider in making a stop. Judge Kozinski had previously outlined the rationale for this effort:
What factors law enforcement officers may consider in deciding
to stop and question citizens minding their own business should,
if possible, be carefully circumscribed and clearly articulated.
When courts invoke multi-factor tests, balancing of interests or
fact-specific weighing of circumstances, this introduces a troubling degree of uncertainty and unpredictability into the process;
no one can be sure whether a particular combination of factors
97
will justify a stop until a court has ruled on it.
Other lower court decisions also reflect an effort to limit Border Patrol discretion by finding that certain factors cannot be relied upon in
deciding to make a stop. Indeed, despite the Supreme Court's pronouncement that race can be considered in an immigration stop,98 the
Ninth Circuit held in 2000 that "Hispanic appearance" could not legitimately be relied upon by the Border Patrol in stopping a vehicle, thereby
99
limiting the discretion of immigration officers.
The Supreme Court rebuked the Ninth Circuit's approach in Arvizu.
It reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision on the grounds that it was inconsistent with well-established precedent that the "totality of the circumstances"
could supply the reasonable suspicion necessary for an investigatory
stop. 10 0 Acknowledging the Ninth Circuit's desire to limit law enforcement discretion and promote consistency in law enforcement, the Court
believed that de novo appellate review would promote these goals. 10 1
B.

The U.S. Customs Experience

The "border exception" to the Fourth Amendment and the power to
use race in immigration enforcement have encouraged, rather than discouraged, race-based border enforcement. For example, until recently,
102-13 and accompanying text (discussing experience in U.S. Customs Service with
broad discretion in border searches).
97. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d at 1142 (Kozinski, J., concurring); see also
United States v. Sigmond-Ballesteros, 247 F.3d 943, 947 (9th Cir. 2001) (reaching
similar conclusion as court in Montero-Camargo); United States v. ChavezValenzuela, 268 F.3d 719, 725-26 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that nervousness could
not justify prolonged detention and search for drugs).
98. See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text (discussing Brignoni-Ponce).
99. See Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d at 1135. In Arvizu, the Solicitor General
resisted this attempt and argued (although the issue was not squarely raised in the
case) that law enforcement should have the discretion to consider race in some
instances in deciding whether to make a stop. See Brief for the United States at *29
& n.16, United States v. Arvizu, 122 S.Ct. 744 (2001) (No. 00-1519), available at
2001 WL 826745.
100. See United States v. Arvizu, 122 S.Ct. 744 (2002).
101. See id. at 751 (citing Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 691 (1996)).
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the U.S. Customs Service was regularly reported to be conducting discriminatory searches. 10 2 A U.S. General Accounting Office study found that,
during fiscal years 1997 and 1998, U.S. Customs Service officers were more
likely to subject Black women entering the country to intrusive searches
than any other group. In fact,
Black women who were U.S. citizens ...were 9 times more likely
than White women who were U.S. citizens to be x-rayed after being frisked or patted down .... But on the basis of x-ray results,

Black women who were U.S. citizens were less than half as likely
to be found carrying contraband as White women who were U.S.
03
citizens.1
In one lawsuit, after she complained about how customs inspectors treated
a Nigerian citizen, an African American U.S. citizen returning from Nigeria was subjected to a full pat down and strip search, and many other intruof her rectal and vaginal cavities,
sive procedures, including examination
10 4
in an unsuccessful hunt for drugs.
Along with drug courier profiles, 105 stereotypes of Black women may
10 6
consciously or unconsciously result in this pattern of intrusive searches.
Intense scrutiny of travelers from drug producing countries also may have
racial impacts,10 7 just as police reliance on the fact that a suspect was in a
102. See, e.g., Daria MonDesire, Stripped of More Than My Clothes, USA

TODAY,

Apr. 7, 1999, at 15A (offering personal account of strip search by U.S. Customs of
only African American woman on flight); Matt O'Connor, Jury Hears Details of StripSearch; X-Rays Also Taken of Woman by Customs Agents, CHI. Tful., Aug. 14, 2001, at
IMetro (reporting on trial in which African American woman returning from Jamaica was subject to strip search by U.S. Customs Service officers); David Stout,
Customs Service Will Review Drug-Search Processfor Bias, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 1999, at
A18 (reporting claims of racial discrimination by U.S. Customs Service officers in
searches). As was the case with Customs Service searches, evidence suggests that
African Americans and Latina/os are subject to more intrusive traffic stops than
other groups, while no more likely to be discovered with contraband. See HOWARD
P. GREENWALD, FINAL REPORT: POLICE VEHICLE STOPS IN SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA
35-36 (2001).
103. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE: BETrER TARGETING OF AIRLINE PASSENGERS FOR PERSONAL SEARCHES COULD PRODUCE BETTER RESULTS 2 (2000).

104. See Brent v. United States, 66 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1290 (S.D. Fla. 1999),
affd sub nom., Brent v. Ashley, 247 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2001).
105. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
106. See Lori A. Tribbett-Williams, Saying Nothing, Talking Loud: Lil' Kim and
Foxy Brown, Caricatures of African-American Womanhood, 10 S. CAL. REV. L. & WoMEN'S STUD. 167, 170-71 (2000); see also Karen Brown Dunlap, Little Things Add Up,
Subtle DiscriminationFollows Non-White Travelers, CHI. TRIB., July 16, 2000, at C8 (discussing how stereotypes of African Americans subject them to various indignities
when they travel).

107. See, e.g., United States v. Ogberaha, 771 F.2d 655, 658 (2d Cir. 1985)
(stating that one factor that Customs Service officers in conducting intrusive
search relied on was that defendant "traveled from a country that is a drug source
(Nigeria)").
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"high crime" neighborhood may have. 10 8
The broad discretion afforded Customs Service officers no doubt
played a role in racially disparate search patterns. One U.S. Congressman
analyzed the problem as follows:
[O]ne of my greatest concerns has been the almost complete discretion that Customs inspectors have when deciding which travelers
to stop and search. It appears that Customs criteriafor stoppingpassengers is so broad that an inspector can justify stoppingjust about anybody. Ifear that, when given this discretion, an inspector's racialbiases,
either conscious or subconscious, influence who is stopped and
searched.10 9
After public attention focused on its race-based search practices, the
U.S. Customs Service, to its credit, promptly responded. The Customs Service Commissioner appointed a commission, which issued a report on personal searches by the Customs Service. 110 A new personal search
handbook required supervisor approval for all pat down personal
searches, records kept of all negative personal searches, port director approval of searches that require medical assistance, and that, when conducting a personal search or taking a person to a medical facility, officers
must explain the process and timelines to the person.''
After remedial steps were in place, the Customs Service reported seventy-five percent fewer personal searches and a dramatic "226% improvement in the rate of 'positive"' searches-namely, those that produced
contraband.11 2 Limited discretion thus resulted in fewer but, from a law
108. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000) (stating that Court had
"previously noted the fact that the stop occurred in a 'high crime area' among the
relevant contextual considerations in a Terry analysis") (citing Adams v. Williams,
407 U.S. 143, 144 (1972)); David A. Harris, Factorsfor Reasonable Suspicion: When
Black and Poor Means Stopped and Frisked,69 IND. L.J. 659, 660-61 (1994) (observing
that consideration of presence in "high crime area" has disparate impact on poor
African Americans and Latina/os); Stanley A. Goldman, Runningfrom Rampart, 34
Loy. L.A. L. REv. 777, 780 (2001) ("Police use Terry stops aggressively in high crime
neighborhoods; as a result, African Americans and Hispanic Americans are subjected to a high number of stops and frisks.").
109. Allegations of Racial Profiling by U.S. Customs, 1999 WL 321644 (May 20,
1999) (opening statement of John Lewis, Member, House Comm. on Ways and
Means) (emphasis added).
110. See

PERSONAL

SEARCH

REVIEW

COMMISSION,

REPORT

ON

PERSONAL

SEARCHES BY THE UNITED STATES CUSTOMS SERVICE (2000).

111. See U.S. Customs Service, New Handbook Explains Changes to Personal
Search Policy (Dec. 2000), at http://www.customs.gov/custoday/dec1999/handbook.htm. The handbook was released in September 1999. See U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE, PERSONAL SEARCH HANDBOOK (Sept. 1999). It remains to be seen whether
new security and related measures put in place after September 11, 2001, see supra
notes 64, 79-85 and accompanying text, will adversely affect the Custom Service's
progress in reducing racial profiling.
112. See U.S. Customs Service, Customs Releases New PersonalSearch Statistics, at
http://www.customs.gov/hot-new/pressrel/2000/0410-Ol.htm (last visited Apr.
10, 2000).
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enforcement standpoint, more efficient, searches. This suggests that
tighter limits on officer discretion, including those that limit the consider1 13
ation of race, may in fact improve, not hinder, law enforcement.
III.

IMPACT OF DISCRETION ON THE ROLE OF RACE IN LAW ENFORCEMENT

Parts I and II of this Article analyzed the discretionary consideration
of race in law enforcement and how this plays out in the border region.
Reliance on profiles is possible in no small part because of the broad discretion afforded law enforcement officers. Use of profiles allows law enforcement to categorize and process vast amounts of information, thereby
simplifying a complex world.1 14 It is cognitively efficient, and necessary,
to rely on generalizations in daily life. Racial categorizations, however,
may be imbued with stereotypes and over-generalizations, and shaped by
unconscious racism. 1 5 The expansive discretion afforded law enforcement authorities allows for overbroad racial categorization to be employed
and to adversely affect minority communities.
Many modern criminal procedure doctrines are filled with grants of
discretion to law enforcement officers. 116 Traffic stops are the epitome of
police discretion:
Police officers exercise a tremendous amount of discretion in the
exercise of their official law enforcement duties. The decisions
to stop, detain or arrest an individual are all left to the discretion
of police officers .... The ... serious disadvantage of discretionary
police power lies in its potentialfor abuse. Pretextual traffic stops exemplify this abuse when race-eitherconsciously or unconsciously-infuses
1 17
the decision to stop a motorist.

Although rights of government have expanded under the Fourth
Amendment, the Supreme Court occasionally, such as in the creation of
the Mirandawarnings, continues to make clear rules that bind police con113. See Harris, supra note 31, at 12 (offering reasons why eradication of racial
profiling will result in improved law enforcement).
114. See generally Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L.
REv. 1161, 1188 (1995) (analyzing racial discrimination caused by human need for

categorization).
115. See Lawrence, supra note 24, at 323 (studying unconscious nature of
much racism and discrimination in modern world).
116. See Erik Luna, TransparentPolicing,85 IowA L. REv. 1107, 1138-43 (2000)
(analyzing implications of discretion of law enforcement authorities in enforcing

crime); Maclin, supra note 22, at 386 (same); L. Darnell Weeden, It Is Not Right

Under the Constitution to Stop and Frisk Minority People Because They Don't Look Right, 21
ARK. LITrLE ROCK L. REV. 829, 836 (1999) (contending that stop-and-frisk authority given to police under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), has resulted in dis-

U.

criminatory law enforcement against African Americans).
117. Davis, supra note 14, at 427-28 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
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duct. 118 At the same time, however, the Court has vacillated between the
types of authority it is willing to afford police under the Fourth Amendment. It invalidated a traffic checkpoint program designed to uncover illegal narcotics,'1 9 but allowed police the authority to arrest a person for a
minor criminal offense, 120 and has permitted police to consider the totality of the circumstances in deciding whether to conduct an investigatory
12 1
stop.
There is little evidence that broad delegations of discretion enhance
law enforcement efficiency. They have undermined the confidence of minority communities in the impartiality of the police.' 2 2 This lack of confidence stems from both perceived and actual racially disparate impacts in
law enforcement. For example, a study of Terry stops concluded that only
two to five percent resulted in an arrest, and suggested that law enforcement officers apply the Tery standard differently based on the suspect's
race. 12 3 A study of Border Patrol stops in southern Arizona, many of
which almost undoubtedly were based at least in part on race, 124 found
that only 14 of 534 vehicle stops-less than three percent-resulted in
arrests. 125 The strikingly low efficiency rates mean that many innocent
persons are erroneously stopped. To the extent that race plays into the
stops or, perhaps more importantly, that the person stopped perceives
that race resulted in the stop, this undercuts their sense of full member126
ship and equal citizenship in U.S. society.
At a time when Border Patrol officers are being hired in large numbers to bolster border enforcement, a reassessment of how they in fact
enforce the law is in order.' 27 To limit undue reliance on race, more
118. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000) (re-affirming
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)).
119. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 47 (2000). The Supreme Court, however, in Edmond expressed greater willingness to afford discretion to the Border Patrol because of "'the formidable law enforcement problems'
posed by the northbound tide of illegal entrants into the United States." Id. at 38
(quoting Martinez-Fuerte v. United States, 428 U.S. 543, 551 (1976)).
120. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001).
121. See, e.g., United States v. Arvizu, 122 S. Ct. 744 (2002) (holding that Border Patrol could consider totality of circumstances in immigration stop); Illinois v.
Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000) (allowing police to consider fact that person
fled upon seeing police in deciding to conduct stop); see also supra notes 93-101
and accompanying text (analyzing Arvizu).
122. See Harris, supra note 14, at 298-300.
123. See Brief Amicus Curiae for the DKT Liberty Project in Support of Respondent at *7, United States v. Arvizu, 122 S. Ct. 744 (2002) (No. 00-1519).
124. See supra notes 52-64 and accompanying text.
125. Brief Amicus Curiae for the DKT Liberty Project for Support of Respondent at *8, Arvizu (No. 00-1519).
126. See generally KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE CONSTITUTION (1989) (analyzing efforts by various minority groups

to achieve full membership in U.S. society).
127. See Pub. L. No. 107-56 § 402, 115 Stat. 272, 351 (2001) (USA PATRIOT
Act) (authorizing appropriations necessary to triple Border Patrol personnel along
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limited discretion might be required. Judicial efforts to narrow the factors
that law enforcement may consider in justifying a stop can be viewed as
part of such an effort. 128 The U.S. Customs Service experience, however,
also suggests that limits on discretion, even if self-imposed restrictions
promulgated by the agency, may limit racial disparities and need not ad129
versely impact law enforcement objectives.
The substance of the regulation-whether externally or internally imposed-affects the enforcement of the law. As many have observed, clear
rules are more likely to provide notice and limit abuse than fact-specific
standards. 130 Scholars have engaged in a sustained debate over the efficacy of bright-line rules versus more flexible standards. 13 Specifically, as
Ninth Circuit Judge Kozinski has recognized, 132 Fourth Amendment law
may benefit from clear legal rules that constrain law enforcement. The
Supreme Court1 33 and commentators 13 4 long-have grappled with this difficult issue.
northern boundary). In the 1990s, Congress had authorized large increases in
Border Patrol personnel and expenditures. See generally Hing, supra note 5 (analyzing human impacts of increased border control).
128. See supra text accompanying notes 93-101.
129. See supra text accompanying notes 102-13.
130. See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 626 (1990) (stating that
multi-factored analysis in personal jurisdiction promoted "uncertainty and litigation"); see also Christopher D. Cameron & Kevin R. Johnson, Death of a Salesman?
Forum Shopping and Outcome Determination Under International Shoe, 28 U.C. DAVIS
L. REv. 769, 833 (1995) (calling for greater certainty in jurisdictional doctrine).
131. For a summary of scholarly discussion in the area, see Spencer Overton,
Rules, Standards, and Bush v. Gore: Form and the Law of Democracy, 37 HARv. C.R.C.L. L. REv. 65, 73-75 (2002). See also FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES 1
(1991); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARv.
L. REv. 1685, 1690 (1976); Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40
STAN. L. REv. 577, 590 (1988); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56
U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1180 (1989); Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L.
REv. 379, 390-93 (1985); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and
Standards, 106 HARV. L. REv. 22, 62 (1992); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83
CAL. L. REv. 953, 961 (1995).
132. See supra note 97 and accompanying text (quoting Judge Kozinski in
Montero-Camargo).
133. See, e.g.,
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 126-27 (2000) (Stevens,J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (stating that both prosecution and defense argued for "bright-line rule" in their favor and that he agreed with Court's "totality
of the circumstances" approach to whether police had reasonable suspicion required by Terry); see also Bruce A. Green & Daniel Richman, Of Laws and Men: An
Essay on Justice Marshall'sView of CriminalProcedure,26 ARIz. ST. L.J. 369, 375 (1994)
(analyzing concerns expressed by Justice Marshall in his dissenting opinions about
impact of police discretion on racial minorities). CompareRochin v. California, 342
U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (holding that search that "shocked the conscience" violated
due process), with id. at 175 (Black, J., concurring) (objecting to excessive subjectivity of majority's ruling).
134. See Albert W. Alschuler, Bright Line Fever and the Fourth Amendment, 45 U.
PIrr. L. REv. 227, 232 (1984); Morgan Cloud, Pragmatism, Positivism, and Principles
in Fourth Amendment Theory, 41 UCLA L. REv. 199, 226 (1993); Christopher
Slobogin, The World Without a Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA L. REv. 1, 14 (1991); see
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Importantly, as alluded to previously, any procedures limiting officer
discretion need not be judicially generated.13-5 As Professor Anthony Amsterdam advocated in an influential article published over twenty-five years
ago, police departments would do well to promulgate regulations governing officer conduct, with the Fourth Amendment demanding adherence to them. 136 Mere promulgation of regulations by the Customs
Service in response to claims of racial profiling in searches resulted in
great, perhaps monumental, improvements. 137 Many state and local governments currently are in the process of requiring law enforcement agencies under their jurisdiction to issue racial profiling policies as a response
to the furor over perceived abuse. 138 The response to the claims of racial
also Donald A. Dripps, Constitutional Theory for Criminal Procedure: Dickerson, Mi-

randa, and the ContinuingQuest for Broad-But-Shallow,43 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1, 4050 (2001) (summarizing competing views of commentators on question of rules
versus standards in criminal procedure).
135. Cf RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, FAILED REVOLUTIONS: SOCIAL
REFORM AND LIMITS OF LEGAL IMAGINATION (1994) (analyzing limits of law and lawyers in achieving social change); GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN
COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991) (questioning ability of courts to

bring about meaningful social change).
136. See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN.
L. REV. 349, 416 (1974); see also Anthony G. Amsterdam, The Supreme Court and the
Rights of Suspects in Criminal Cases, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 785, 812 (1970); Wayne R.
LaFave, ControllingDiscretion by Administrative Regulations: The Use, Misuse, and Nonuse of Police Rules and Policies in Fourth Amendment Adjudication, 89 MICH. L. REV. 442,
448 (1990); Carl McGowan, Rule-Making and the Police, 70 MICH. L. REv. 659, 676
(1972). For a debate about whether police should promulgate rules to regulate
the enforcement of the criminal law, compare RonaldJ. Allen, The Police and Substantive Rulemaking: Reconciling Principle and Expediency, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 62, 67
(1976) (contending that such rulemaking is inconsistent with theory of U.S. government), with Kenneth Culp Davis, Police Rulemaking on Selective Enforcement: A
Reply, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 1167, 1169 (1977) (advocating such rulemaking and noting its consistency with U.S. government).
137. See supra notes 102-13 and accompanying text.
138. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STATS. § 24-31-309(6) (2001) (requiring every state
and local law enforcement agency to "establish and enforce a written antiracial
profiling policy governing the conduct of peace officers engaged in stops of citizens"); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15A.195(4) (a) (2001) (same); Mo. REv. STAT.
§ 590.650(5) (2001) (same); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22 § 34.3(E) (2001) (same); 2001
Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 8, Article 7, § 626.8471 (West) (same); 2001 Neb. Laws 593
§ 4; 2001 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. § 947 Art. 2.132 (Vernon) (same); see also Brown v.
City of Oneonta, 235 F.3d 769, 786-87 (2d Cir. 2000) (Calabresi,J., dissenting from
denial of rehearing en banc) (contending that courts should encourage legislatures to develop guidelines for use of race in criminal investigation); David A. Harris, "Driving While Black" and All Other Traffic Offenses: The Supreme Court and
Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 544, 576-79 (1997) (advocating increased police regulation of traffic stops); Harris, supra note 14, at 322-23
(same); Sean Hecker, Race and PretextualTraffic Stops: An Expanded Role for Civilian
Review, 28 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 551, 592-604 (1997) (contending civilian review boards should be employed to avoid racial profiling); Christopher Slobogin,
An Empirically Based Comparison of American and European Regulatory Approaches to
Police Investigation, 22 MICH. J. INT'L L. 423, 455-56 (2001) (advocating legislative
efforts to regulate police investigation based on comparative analysis and concluding that "[t] he European codes of criminal procedure are far superior to the judi-
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profiling has been encouraging, although the ultimate impact on police
conduct remains uncertain.
The possible reliance on internal regulations to constrain police reliance on race does not suggest that the courts should refrain from enforcing constitutional norms. The judicial role, of course, remains fully
intact. 13 9 Important efforts have been made in this area by the lower
courts in recent years. 1 40 Nevertheless, reforms within law enforcement
agencies might improve matters and, for that reason, deserve serious consideration. As a purely practical matter, it is difficult to imagine the courts
in the current political and social climate intervening in a law enforce14 1
ment matter implicating border security.

IV.

CONCLUSION

Race influences the war on drugs and the enforcement of the immigration laws. The two, both domestically and internationally, are inextricably intertwined. Excessive discretion bestowed on law enforcement
officers has increased the chance for race to unduly influence the enforcement of the drug and immigration laws. Once race seeps into the enforcement calculus, it often comes to dominate the enforcement of both bodies
of law. Reforms in the U.S. Customs Service limiting law enforcement discretion to conduct searches have increased law enforcement efficiency
and inspired confidence in previously victimized communities. We would
do well to consider similar reform efforts that address the issue of the
discretion of law enforcement officers.

cially created American rules in terms of comprehensiveness and clarity"). By
allowing police to self-regulate, this proposal is in some ways consistent with the
calls for community policing. Compare Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, The
Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 86 GEo. L.J. 1153, 1166 (1998) (questioning

efficacy of legal standards applicable to community policing and advocating increased discretion to local communities seeking to address crime), with David
Cole, Discretion and DiscriminationReconsidered: A Response to the New CriminalJustice
Scholarship, 87 GEO. L.J. 1059, 1071-74 (1999) (questioning this approach).
139. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 490 (1966) (rejecting argument

that Court should postpone decision on warnings to suspect until state and local
legislative bodies had opportunity to pass constitutional laws).
140. See supra notes 93-101 and accompanying text (discussing Ninth Circuit's
analysis in Arvizu and other cases).
141. See supra notes 79-85 and accompanying text.
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